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In the 
SUPREME COURT 
o,f the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CARL NELSON DAY, 
Plaintiff and App·ellant, 
vs. 
J. GEORGE JONES, JR., and MRS. 
J GEORGE JONES, JR., his wife, 
whose true and correct na:rpe is 
otherwise unknown, 
Defendants atnd Respondents. 
Case No. 
7466 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
FACTS OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff commenced this action against the two 
named defendants in the District Court of · Millard 
County, Utah, to recover actual damages for the taking 
and disposing of a crop of grain, the property of the 
plaintiff, and exemplary damages by reason of the will-
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ful and malicious nature of the actions of such defend-
ants in so taking and disposing of the plaintiff's such 
property. (Record p. 1-5.) 
The District Court sustained (Record p. 15) a gen-
eral demurrer of the said defendants to plaintiff's com-
plaint, whereupon plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint 
herein (Record p. 17-21). The defendants filed their 
general demurrer to such Amended Complaint and also 
filed their answer thereto (Record p. 24-27). The plain-
tiff filed his Reply to such answer (Record p. 30-31). 
Thereafter the District Court sustained the general de-
murrer to the Amended Complaint (Record p. 32). The 
plaintiff having failed '"and refused to file a further 
amended complaint, the District Court made and entered 
its Judgment of Dismissal (Record p. 33) from \vhich 
judgment the plaintiff appealed to the. Supreme Court 
of Utah which Court ordered the case remanded to the 
District Court with directions to set aside the order of 
dismissal entered therein and the order sustaining the 
demurrer and take proper further proceedings. (Carl 
Nelson Day v. J. George Jones, Jr., et ux, Case No. 7288, 
Supreme Court of Utah) (Record p. 38-39). This case 
was then tried upon the pleadings then before the Court. 
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's introduction of evi-
dence the defendants each moved the Court for Judg-
ment of Nonsuit or in the alternative for judgment for 
·nominal damages only (Record p. 46; Transcript p. 41-
42); whereupon the court rendered judgment for nonsuit 
as to the defendant Mrs. J. George Jones, Jr., and for 
plaintiff against the defendant J·. George Jones, Jr., for 
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nominal damages only in the amount of $1.00 (Record 
p. 51-52; Transcript p. 43-44), from 'Yhieh judgment plain-
tiff no'Y appeals. 
The facts are that plaintiff purchased the following 
described property situated in Millard County, Utah, on 
22 1\fay 1940 and ever since has been and now is the legal 
o"~ner and entitled to the immediate and exclusive pos-
session thereof (Record p. 17 and 24). Such property is 
described as follows: 
The North one-half of the Southwest quarter 
of Section 34, Township 20 South, Range 5 West, 
S. L. B. & 1\I. 
The defendant J. George Jones, Jr., on or about 28 
May 1943 for the sum of $31.07 procured from Millard 
County a quit claim deed to such land (Record p. 17, 24 
and 47). Such deed and sale by Millard County were at 
all times mentioned and now are void (Record p. 17 and 
24). Plaintiff in writing and by mail notified such de-
fendant on or about 1 August 1943 and again on or about 
20 March 1944 that plaintiff was the owner of the land 
and claimed the same, and advised such defendant that 
plaintiff was in the l\!ilitary Service of the United States 
at the time of such void sale by Millard County and that 
the provisions of the Soldiers' and Sailors Civil Relief 
Act of 1940 with its amendments would govern such sale 
(Record p. 17; Transcript p. 35; Exhibits 1 and 2). 
Thereafter in the year 1945 the said defendants went 
upon the plaintiff's said lands and commenced to farm 
and crop the same. 
5 
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On 15 July 1946 plaintiff commenced an action in 
the District Court of Millard County, Utah, against the 
defendants named herein, and others, to quiet title to 
said property. The said defendants were each duly 
served with Summons and copy of the complaint therein 
on 16 July 1946 (Record p. 18, 24 and 47). 
Thereafter in the fall of the year 1946, the said de-
fendants again prepared the said land for planting and 
did plant another crop of grain thereon (Record p. 18, 
24, 26 and 47). Thereafter the said defendants did by 
their pleadings in the said action set up claims against 
the plaintiff for and in connection with the said newly 
planted crop of grain, and at the trial of the said action 
before the said District Court on 4 and 5 December 1946, 
all of the matter of the rights and claims of the said de-
fendants against the said plaintiff and in and to the said 
land and the said alleged improvements and the said 
crop was fully presented to the said Court for determina-
tion and was fully and completely litigated in the said 
action (Record p. 18-19, 25 and 4 7). 
The said District Court on or about 12 March 1947 
did make and enter its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and Decree in the said action wherein and where-
by the said Court adjudged and determined that the 
plaintiff was the owner absolute and in fee simple and 
entitled to the immediate possession of the said lands 
and premises and the alleged improvements including the 
said crop which were thereon and a part thereof, and 
that all of the claims and pretensions of the said defend-
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nuts ns contained in their said pleadings, or whatever, 
\\·ere \Yithout good faith, "'t)re "·ithout right, and were 
perpetually estopped, enjoined and barred (Record p. 
19, 23, 26 and 47; last paragraph of Supreme Court de-
cision,Day r. Jo-nes, X o. 706~, in Exhibits envelope). 
Thereafter by Yirtue of the said Findings, Conclu-
sion and Decree in the said action the plaintiff did on 
or about 15 ~larch 1947 peac.eably enter upon his said 
premises "'"ith the intention of taking and assuming pos-
session thereof including the said crop of grain then 
gro,ving upon the said premises and being a part thereof, 
and the plaintiff did remain upon and did work upon the 
said premises repairing fences thereon for several days 
(Record p. 19 and 48; Transcript p. 33 through 40). 
Thereafter on or about 19 1Iarch 1947 the said de-
fendants, by and through their agents and employees, 
did belligerently and by show of force eject and remove 
the plaintiff from his said lands and premises and did 
re-enter and reassume possession thereof, and said de-
fendants did thereupon continue in possession of the 
said lands and premises until on or about 16 December 
1947, the time at which remittiter was made to the Dis-
trict Court by the Supreme Court in the first action as 
herein below set forth (Record p. 19 and 48; Transcript 
p. 34 to 40). 
About or during the month of July 1947 the ·said 
defendants harvested, removed and carried away from 
the said lands the said crop of grain, being 2383.68 
bushels of \vheat the property of the plaintiff, and did 
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assume and exercise the right of ownership over such 
crop of grain to the exclusion of the plaintiff's rights 
therein, and did sell or otherwise dispose of the said 
crop of grain, and since such time have been and now are 
unable to deliver the same to plaintiff (Record p. 19-20, 
25 and 48; Transcript p. 13, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19). 
The matter of the rights and claims of the said de-
fendants against the plaintiff and in and to the said 
land, the alleged improvements and the said crop, was by 
appeal of such action by the said defendants fully pre-
sented to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah and 
was fully litigated therein (Carl Nelson Da.y v. J. George 
Jones, Jr., et al., case number 7062, reported in 187 P. 
(2d) at page 181) (Record p. 20, 25, 26 and 49). This 
court did unanimously on or about 24 November 1947 
duly affirm the decision of the District Court in the said 
case, and did affirm the holding of the trial court that 
the actions of the said def en dan ts with regard to the 
alleged improvements and the said crop were not in good 
faith. Remittiter to the District Court was duly made 
on or about 16 December 1947, and such judgment and 
decree of said District Court, so affirmed, is now in full 
force and effect and unchanged (Record p. 20, 25, 49; 
Supreme Court decision in case No. 7062, in Exhibits' 
envelope). 
All of the actions of the said defendants relating to 
the said crop of grain were willful, wrongful, malicious, 
unlawful, fraudulent, with full knowledge in them of the 
plaintiff's O"\Vnership of and claim to the said land and 
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the said crop, \Yith full knowledg-e in them of the com-
mencement of the said artion, of the pendency thereof 
and of the judgment and decree of the court therein, with 
"'"anton disregard of the plaintiff's rights therein, \vith-
out the consent of the plaintiff or any rightful authority 
\vhatever, \vithout good faith, but \Yith evil intention to 
take unconscientious advantage of the plaintiff ( Tran-
script p. 9, 13, 1±, 15, 16, 17, and 4±). 
The said crop of grain, being 2383.68 bushels of 
wheat, has a fluctuating market value; it has been of a 
market value of $2.35 per bushel, or $6,078.38 total value, 
sinee the time of the "rrongful taking and disposal there-
of by, the ·said defendants (Record p. 48; Transcript p. 
24, 27, 32). 
The defendants by their wrongful and willful tak-
ing and disposal of plaintiff's said crop of grain have 
damaged plaintiff in the amount of $6,078.38 actual dam-
ages; and by reason of the willful, wanton, malicious and 
wrongful nature of such actions on the parts of said 
defendants, plaintiff is entitled to recover from defend-
ants the further sum of $3,000.00 as exemplary damages. 
The above statement of facts is in substance the 
admitted and proven facts as shown by the pleadings 
and the evidence introduced at the trial of this action 
now before the Court. 
To assist this Court 1n understanding the matter 
completely, however, it is felt the following facts should 
be presented her-e also : 
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On or about 20 March 1947, a day or so after plain-
tiff was ejected from his premises by the said defendants 
as herein set forth, the District Court made its order 
staying the execution of its Decree previously made and 
entered therein, and on or about 25 March 194 7 'the said 
defendants filed therein Notice of Appeal and what was 
termed Undertaking for Costs and to Stay Execution. 
The said undertaking was in the amount of $300 as re-
quired under Section 104-41-7 U.C.A. 1943 and the fur-
ther sum of $1,000 allegedly under Section 104-41-11. 
The plaintiff filed his motion to require an increase in 
the amount of the stay bond to the sum of $6,400 and to 
require ·a conformance with the provisions of the said 
Section 104-41-11 U.C.A. 1943. The said District Court, 
after two hearings thereon, did require an additional 
bond of $948 which was provided by the said defendants. 
POINTS FOR REVERSAL 
The points upon which appellant relies for a re-
versal of the judgment of the District Court in this 
· rna tter are : 
1. Possession of premises by defendants at time 
crop harvested immaterial as defendants' rights and 
claims in crop were res judicata. 
2. Possession of premises by defendants at time 
crop harvested immaterial as defendants' rights and 
claims in crop "\\rere barred by statute. 
3. Possession of premises by defendants at time 
crop harvested immaterial as defendants' rights and 
10 
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claims in crop \\Tere lost and barred by plaintiff's taking 
possession of premises \Yhile crop growing thereon. 
4. Effect of supersedeas bond is solely to stay en-
forcement of judgment and does not nullify, void or sus-
pend the judgment. 
5. Action in troYer for conversion or in nature of 
action on the case. 
6. Disposal of subject of action pending appeal is 
contempt of both trial and appellate courts. 
7. Award of nominal damages erroneous where 
plaintiff clearly entitled to substantial damages. 
8. Plaintiff entitled to exemplary damages by 
reason of the willful, wanton, malicious and wrongful 
nature of defendants' actions. 
ARGU~!ENT 
POSSESSION ·OF PREMIS.ES BY DEFENDANTS AT 
TIME CROP HARVESTED IMMATERIAL AS DEFEND-
ANTS' RIGHTS AND CLAIMS IN CROP WERE 
RES JUDIC'ATA. 
In the case at bar the District Court in its Order 
Sustaining Demurrer (Record p. 15) to plaintiff's ori-
ginal complaint, based its such order, as stated therein, 
upon a "consideration of authorities cited in 17 Corpus 
Juris at page 381, Section 7." The cases referred to in 
this citation are cases in which the possessor of land, 
such possession being either rightful or wrongful, plants, 
11 
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cultivates and harvests crops thereon. The general rule 
given in these cases is that the crops belong to the one 
so planting, cultivating and harvesting provided he re-
main continuously in possession of the land and crops 
until after such time as the crops are harvested. 
The District Court at the argument of the demurrer 
to the amended complaint stated that the court felt the 
reasoning as referred to in such Order Sustaining De-
murrer to the original complaint would apply also to 
the amended complaint, and it is upon such reasoning 
that the District Court made and entered its Order 
Sustaining Demurrer to Amended Complaint (Record 
p. 32) and the Judgment of Dismissal (Record p. 33), 
and it is upon the same reasoning that the District Court 
entered the present judgment in this case (Transcript p. 
43), from which judgment plaintiff no'v appeals. 
It is the contention of the plaintiff and appellant 
that the fact or not of possession by the said defendants 
herein of the premises at the time the said crop was 
harvested is immaterial under the facts and circum-
stances of this particular case at bar. 
The case at bar is distinguished completely from 
the class of cases referred to in the District Court's 
Order Sustaining Demurrer, by the fact that in the case 
at bar the "matter of the rights and claims of the swid 
defendants against the plaintiff and in a.ncl to the said 
lands and the alleged improvements including the said 
crop was at the trial of the said action in December 
1946 fully presented to the said Court for determina-
12 
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tion anJ. loas fully litigated in the said action." This ~is 
the \\yarding of Paragraph 6 of the said Amended Com-
plaint (Record p. 18, 19), \Yhich is admitted by the said 
defendants both in their general demurrer to the said 
·"' 
amended complaint and in their Answer to Amended 
Complaint (Record p. 25) ; and it is the substance of 
parag-raph 6 of the Findings of Fact in this case (Record 
p. 47). These claims of the defendants in and to the crop 
were denied by the trial and Supreme Courts in the said 
prior action between the parties. Paragraph 7 of the 
Findings of F1 act in this case, drawn by counsel for de-
fendants, correctly sets forth that the Court in the for-
mer case 
''determined and adjudged that the plaintiff was 
the owner absolute and in fee simple and entitled 
to the immediate possession of said lands and 
premises and the improvements made thereon, in-
cluding the said growing crop of wheat.'' (Record 
p. 47). 
30 A rnerican Jurisprudence 920 : ''It is a 
fundamental principle of jurisprudence that ma-
terial facts or questions which were in issue in a 
former action, and were there admitted or ju-
dicially determined, are conclusively settled by 
a judgment rendered therein, and that such facts 
or questions become res judicata and may not 
again be litigated in a subsequent action between 
the same parties or their privies, regardless of 
the form the issue may take in the subsequent 
action, whether the subsequent action involves 
the same or a different form of proceeding, or 
\Vhether the second action is upon the same or a 
different c.ause of action, subject matter, claim, 
or demand, as the earlier action. In such ca~es, 
it is also immaterial that the two actions are based 
13 
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on different grounds, or tried on different 
theories, or instituted for different purposes, and 
seek different relief." 
(Citing many cases, including the following): 
Smith v. Clark, 37 Utah 116, 106 P. 653, 26 
L.R.A. N.S. 953. At page 660 of 106 Pacific Re-
porter, this Court states: "On the face of the 
judgment and pleadings in the replevin action 
offered in evidence it affirmatively appears that 
both the ownership and right of possession of the 
property were actually litigated and directly de-
termined, and that the determination of both such 
questions was necessary to the judgment. The 
right of possession was there made dependent 
upon the question of o"\vnership. When in a sub-
sequent action, though in a different form, such 
questions recur between the same parties, and 
are again raised and litigated, such former ad-
judication is, upon such questions, not only com-
petent, but binding, evidence.'' 
Barnk of America v. 11fcLa.ughlin Co., 40 Cal. 
App. (2d) 620, 105 P. (2d) 607, certiorari denied, 
61 Sup. Ct. 958, 313 U.S. 571, 85 L. Ed. 1529, in 
a· consideration of res judicata cites the law as 
follows: 
34 Cor pus J tttris 922 : ''If the questions in-
volved in a suit are tried and decided, no matter 
how numerous they may be, the estoppel of the 
judgment will apply to each point so settled, in the 
same degree as if it were the sole issue in the 
case. 
34 Cor pus Juris 773 : ''A general affirmance 
of a judgment on appeal makes it res judicata as 
to all the issues, claims, or controversies involved 
in the action and passed upon by the court below, 
although the appellate court does not consider or 
decide all of them.'' 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
And at page 614 of 105 P. (2d), the court 
states as follows : '' ~ * • the question of the 
finality of the judgment is answered in the re-
eent case of Sutphin v. Speik, Cal. Sup. 99 P. (2d) 
652, 655, "~here the court said: 'Next is the ques-
tion, under "~hat circumstances is a rna tter to be 
deemed decided by the prior judgment~ Ob-
viously, if it is actually raised by proper pleadings 
and treated a.s an issue in the cause, it is con-
clusively determined by the first judgment. But 
the rule goes further. If the matter ~vas within 
the scope of the action, related to the subject ma.t-
ter and relevant to the issues, so that it could 
have been raised, the judgment is conclusive on 
it despite the fact that it uJas not in fact exp,ress.Zy 
pleaded or otherwise urged. The reason for this 
is manifest. A party cannot by negligence or de·-
sign withhold issues and litigate them in con-
secutive actions. Hence the rule is that the prior 
judg1nent is res judicata on matters wlvich w~ere 
rai.sed or could have been rarised, on matters 
litigated or litigable." (citing cases.) 
34 Corpus Juris 827, 828: ''Where a. demand 
or right of action is in its nature entire and in-
divisible, it cannot be split up into several causes 
of action and sued piecemeal, or made the basis 
of as many separate suits, but a recovery on one 
part will bar a subsequent action for the whole, 
the residue, or another part. A like rule forbids 
the splitting of defenses, or set-offs and counter-
claims." (citing many cases). 
See also: 
East :Jfill Creek Water Co. v. Salt Lake City, 
Utah, 159 P. (2d) 863 at 866; Clegg v. Schvane-
veldt, 79 Utah 195, 8 P. (2d) 620; Jeremy Fuel 
Co. v. Mellen, 50 Utah 49, 165 P. 791; Logarn City 
v. Utah Power & Light Co., 86 Utah 340, 16 P. 
(2d) 1097. Affirmed on rehearing, 86 Utah 354, 
15 
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44 P. (2d) 698; Peay v. Salt Lake City, 11 Utah 
331, 40 P. 206, 208; Everill v. Swan, 20 Utah 56, 
57 P. 716, 718. 
34 Corpus Juris 921: "The great prepond-
erance of authority sustains the rule that the 
estoppel of the judgment covers all points tvhich 
were actually litigated and which actually de-
termined the verdict or ji1~dings, whether or not 
they were technically in issue on the face of the 
pleadings.'' 
Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Water Co., 
54 Utah 10, 174 P. 1134, cites and follows 34 
Corpus Juris 501 as follows: 
''A judgment should be so construed as to 
give effect to every \vord and part of it, includ-
ing such effects and consequences as follow by 
necessary legal implication from its terms, al-
though not expressed. 23 Cyc. 1101. '' 
See also Snow v. West, 37 Utah 528, 110 P. 52, 
to the effect that ''Common sense should not be 
lost sight of entirely (in construing a judgment) 
merely because a court acts in conformity to cer-
tain rules of evidence.'' 
The case of Boland v. Nihlros, 79 Utah 331, 10 P. 2d 
930, is quite similar to the case at bar. In that case the 
owner of land brought an action to recover land, the 
defendants claimed possession and set up claim for the 
making of valuable improvements. Upon a trial judg-
ment was had for the plaintiff and denying the de-
fendants claims, which was affirmed on appeal. The 
defendants then filed a petition to adjudicate the value 
of the improvements and recover the same. The matters 
were held to be res adjudicata by the trial court, and 
this court affirmed the same on appeal. 
16 
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POSSESSIO·N OF PREMISES BY DEFENDANTS AT 
TIME CROP HARVESTED IMMATERIAL AS DEFE.ND-
ANTS RIGHTS AND CLAIMS IN CROP WERE BARRED 
BY STATUTE. 
In the first artion bet\Yeen the parties hereto the 
defendants set up their rights and claims in and to the 
said crop by their counterclaims in that first action, 
'\Thich rights and claims the plaintiff denied. Such claims, 
as above noted, were fully litigated and determined ad-
Yerse}y to defendants in the prior action. 
At the time pertinent to this case the Utah statutes 
provided as follows : 
104-9-1 UCA 1943: "The answer of the de-
fendant must contain: 
( 1) A general or specific denial * * * etc. 
(2) A statement of any new matter con-
stituting a defense or counterclaim.'' 
104-9-2 UCA 1943: The counterclaim men-
tioned in the next preceding section must be one 
existing in favor of a defendant and against a 
plaintiff, between whom a several judgment might 
be had in the action, and arising out of one of 
the follo\ving causes of action: 
( 1) A cause of action arising out of the 
transaction set forth in the complalnt as the 
foundation of the plaintiff's claim, or connected 
with the subject of the action. 
104-9-3 UCA 1943: "If the defendant omits 
to set up a counterclaim in the cases mentioned 
in the first subdivision of the next preceding 
section, neither he nor his assignee can after-
17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
wards maintain an action against the plaintiff 
therefor.'' 
The case of Jeremy Fuel & Grain Co. v. Mellen, 50 
U. 49, 165 P. 791 at 794, with reference to Section 2970 
of Comp. Laws 1907 which is identical with 104-9-3 UCA 
1943, holds that the bar provided for by this section is 
entirely apart from the question of res adjudicata. 
Logan City v. Utah Po~ver & Light Co., 86 Utah 
340, 16 P. 2d 1097 at 1101, holds that: 
"* * * it is duty of a party to interpose 
such defense as it may have to an action brought 
against it, and if it fails to do so, resulting judg-
ment is conclusive against it as to all matters of 
defense which were or might have been inter-
posed." 
Witht reference to the case at bar, the defendants 
Jones had in the previous action between the parties 
he-reto set up their claims to the said crop, and such 
claims were fully litigated in the said former action, the 
said defendants vigorously contending that they were 
entitled to the crop and the plaintiff just as vigorously 
contending that they were not entitled to anything. 
Now under the above authorities, if the said defend-
ants had any further claims to make with regard to the 
said crop they must of necessity have presented them 
in the former action, and having failed to do so they 
are bound by the judgment therein. 
18 
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50 Corpus Juris Secu·ndu1n 134 states the rule as 
follo,vs: 
'• If a. defendant, haYing a demand against 
plaintiff pleads it as a set-off or counterclaim 
in the action, he must make the most of his oppor-
tunity and exhibit his whole damage, for the 
judg·ment in the action ''Till prevent him from 
after\Yard using the same matter, or any part of 
it, as a separate cause of action against the for-
mer plaintiff, or as a. defense or counterclaim 
in any subsequent action bet,veen them, whether 
such set -off or counterclaim 'vas allowed or dis-
allowed.'' 
The case of Salt Lake City v. Telluride Power Co., 
82 Utah 607, 17 P. 2d 281, rehearing denied 82 Utah 622, 
26 P. 2d 822, gives the la'Y in Utah as to the method of 
construing prior decrees. Syllabus' 1 and 2 of that case 
include the holding of that case in this regard. I quote: 
Syl. 1 : ''In construing decree-, court may 
refer to pleadings in case and issues joined there-
under to explain and limit language of decree.'' 
Syl. 2: ''Terms of decre-e should be con-
strued t_ogether as whole so as to give effect to 
all of terms, if possible.'' 
In that case the court referred to the abstract of 
proceedings in the prior case to determine from state-
ments of counsel and the trial court just what the issues 
were and how the prior decree should be construed. 
In the case at bar it is admitted by the defendants 
and found by the trial court that all of the defendants 
rights and claims in and to tbe said crop were fully liti-
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gated in the said :first action and such rights and claims 
were denied, and judgment was adverse .to the said de-
fendants and in favor of the plaintiff. Under the above 
authorities there can be no question but that the pur-
ported rights and claims of the defendants in and to the 
said crop were and are barred by the Utah statute. 
POSSESSION OF PREMISES BY DEFENDANTS AT 
TIME CROP HARVESTE.D IMMATERIAL AS DEFEND-
ANTS' RIGHTS AND CLAIMS IN CROP WERE LOST. 
AND BARRE.D BY PLAINTIFF'S TAKING POSSESSIO~N 
OF PREMISES WHILE CRO·P GROWING THEREON. 
In the case at bar upon the making and entering of 
the District Court judgment in the prior action, the 
plaintiff peaceaoly entered upon and assumed possession 
of the premises and the crop. At this point the law is 
definite that the crop ownership would pass to the plain-
tiff, even if the matter of the rights and claims of the 
defendants Jones in and to the crop had not been liti-
gated fully in the prior action and determined against 
the said defendants and in favor of the plaintiff, and 
were and are res judicata and also barred by the Utah 
statutes. 
19 Corpus Juris 1220, Ejectment: "A suc-
cessful plaintiff may enter and take possession 
of the premises independent of process, if he can 
do so peaceably * * *. '' 
15 Arne ric an J ttrisprud ence 223, 224 : '' Crops 
growing on the land at the time of a recovery 
of possession in ejectment are, at eommon law, 
regarded as a part of the realty and pass to the 
20 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
plaintiff in the absenee of eYidence showing any 
right of se\Teranee in favor of the other party. 
This rule rl)sts on the faet that in la\v the de-
fendant is regarded as a trespasser, and upon 
the theory tlla t the crops still stan ding on the 
land and affixed to the soil are part and parcel 
of the land, and are not personal property, and 
recoYery of the land necessarily includes such 
crops. * * * The fact that the defendant in eject-
ment re-enters, after having been dispossessed, 
and harYests the crop that \Vas growing at the 
time he \Yas ejected does not affect the title of 
the plaintiff thereto.'' (Citing many cases). 
Pou~er BJ ere. Co. v. JJ1 oore 1VI ere. Co., (Mont. 
1918), 177 P. 406 at 407 and 408: 
''Such crops are usually regarded and treat-
ed as chattels personal, subject to sale or mort-
gage, and levy of attachment or execution, as 
other chattels are, even while still annexed to the 
soil. * * * Crops of wheat and oats, while grow-
ing, are of necessity physically attached to land 
and accessory to its enjoyment, and for that rea-
son, and in that sense, and for certain purposes, 
are in a variety of circumstances incidental and 
accessory to land; for example, where the owner 
of land sells it \vith right of immediate posses-
sion in the purchaser, and without reservation of 
the emblements then standing on the land, and 
the purchaser take possession before severance, 
title passes to the emblements as well as to the 
land * * * the lau; on this subject is well settled. 
* * *' At once upon the making of the sheriff's 
deed Samuell became tenant by sufferance, for 
he continued in possession wrongfully. Plaintiff 
could have brought that tenancy to an end, with-
out notice, by re-entry, and if it had done so 
prior to severance of the crops it would have 
thereby perfected its title to, and have become 
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the owner of, the crops. * * * The fact that the 
crops were planted by Samuell before his occu-
pancy became wrongful, is of no moment.'' 
In the case at bar the plaintiff, the owner of the 
said premises and the said crop, entered upon the same 
and assumed possession thereof by virtue of the Find-
ings, Conclusions and Decree of the said District Court, 
and at that time the plaintiff's ownership of the said 
crop would have become complete and fixed even if the 
ownership and right to possession of the crop had not 
been litigated in the action and determined.in plaintiff's 
favor by the said judgment. The fact that said defend-
ants Jones thereafter ejected the plaintiff from the 
premises and re-entered thereon, and said defendants 
threafter filed what they termed an Undertaking to 
Stay Execution pending the appeal, and harvested and 
removed and disposed of the said crop pending the 
appeal would not and could not revest ovvnership of 
such crop in such defendants. 
EFFECT OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND IS SOLELY TO 
STAY ENFORCEME'NT OF JUDGMENT AND DOES NOT 
NULLIFY, VOID OR SUSPEND THE JUDGMENT. 
104-41-15 Utah Code Anrnotated 1943: Stay 
of Judgment, etc. 
"Whenever an appea.z is perfected, as pro-
vided in the preceding sections of this chapter, 
it stays all further proceedings in the court below 
upon the judgment or order appealed from or 
upon the matter embraced therein * * * " 
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4 Corpus J u r1~s Secu.nduJn 1149, 1150, 1151: 
.L\ppeal and Error. 
'~The g-eneral rule is that the effect of a 
supersedeas or stay is to suspend proceedings 
and preserve the status quo pending the deter-
mination of the appeal or proceeding- in error. 
* * *It* * does not authorize a.ppellant to do wh(})t 
the judg-Jnent prohibits him. from doing. As a 
rule it does not reverse, annul, or undo what has 
already been done and in most jurisdictions the 
judgment, order or decree is not vacated or an-
nulled, nor is its validity or effect impaired there-
by." 
Bullion, Beck & Cha1npion 1W.in. Co. v. Eureka 
Hill Jlfin. Co., 5 Utah 151,13 P.174: 
Syl. 1 : ''The taking of the appeal and the 
giving of the supersedeas bond does not make 
void or nullify or suspend the judgment, nor an 
injunction contained therein, but all affirmative 
action looking to the execution of the terms of 
the decree are suspended, and the district court 
is empowered to punish as for a contempt any 
violation of any provisions of the injunction. 
(At page 175 of 13 P., the Court states): 
''But the lower court could nevertheless take 
such action as was necessary to hold the property 
intact, and enforce a continuance of the status 
quo. However, the district court, during the pen-
deney of the appeal, could do no act which did not 
look to the holding of the subject of litigation 
just as it existed when the decree was rendered. 
Hovey v. McDonald, 109 U~S. 161, 3 Sup. Ct. 136. 
In the exercise of its authority to preserve the 
property, the district court was empowered to 
punish as for contempt for the violation of any 
provision of the injunction where the parties 
\vere not allowing the property to remain as it 
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was at the date of the decree. If this were not 
so, the recovery in the appellate court might 
often be a barren victory. Sixth Ave. R.R. v. Gil-
bert, 71 N. Y. 430; Heinlen v. Cross, 63 Cal. 44; 
State v. Chase, 41 Ind. 356. '' 
Bullion, Beck & Champion Min. Co. v. Eureka 
Hill Min. Co., 5 Utah 182, 12 P. 660, is to the effect 
that the Supreme Court of Utah could issue an 
injunction to preserve the subject of the litiga-
tion pending an appeal to the United States 
Supreme Court, as otherwise, ''the purpose of 
the appeal will have been defeated, and the ends 
of justice will not have he en reached.'' 
Skeen v. Pratt, 87 Utah 121, 48 P2d 457: 
Syllabus 3 gives the substance of the Court's 
ruling in this regard as follows : 
''Sole purpose of supersedeas bond is to 
stay the enforcement of the judgment or decee 
pending the appeal. ' ' 
5Corpus Juris Secundum 1339, Appeal and 
Error, Effect of Affirmance: 
''Where a final judgment is affirmed on ap-
peal in all its parts and the case is not remanded 
to the lower court for further proceedings, the 
controversy is at an end, the rights of the parties 
in so far as involved in the litigation are con-
clusively adjudicated, further proceedings in the 
case in both the appellate and lower courts are 
precluded, and the judgment of the lower court 
is in full force and effect precisely the same as 
though no appeal had been taken." (Citing many 
cases.) 
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ACTION IN TRO·VER FOR CONVERSION OR IN 
NATURE OF ACTION ON THE C'ASE. 
Counsel for defendants complained and the trial 
court appeared to be in doubt as to ''"hether a cause of 
action for conversion "'"as stated in plaintiff's pleadings 
herein. lTpon that subject reference is made to the fol-
lowing a nthori ties : 
65 Corpus Juris 27: "The severing and re-
moval of gro,ving crops, such as grain, hay, cot-
ton, and the like, constitutes a conversion for 
"'"hich the o'Yner may maintain an action of 
trover.'' 
65 Corpus Juris 31: ''Regardless of whether 
he came into possession of the property la,vfully 
or unla,vfully, a person in possession of the per-
sonal property of another is guilty of conversion 
"rhere he makes an unfounded claim or assertion 
of ownership or title thereto, or treats or deals 
with the property as owner.'' 
8 Corpus Juris Secundum 284: "The general 
tort rule that one who has come into possession of 
propertly lawfully cannot be held liable for con-
version in the absence of demand and refusal to 
delivery has been applied to bailments, but as an 
exception to the general tort rule it has been held 
that a bailee who asserts title hostile to his bailor, 
and wrongfully appropriates the property to his 
o'vn use and benefit, is guilty of an independent 
act of conversion which renders him liable with-
out previous demand by his bailor and refusal to 
deliver." (Citing cases). 
8 Corpus Juris Secondu1n 283: "Any con-
version by a bailee will defeat any lien which 
the bailee may have in the property arising out 
25 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the contract of bailment, and will authorize 
the bailor to sue for conversion." (Citing cases). 
Christensen v. Pugh, 84 Utah 440, 36 P. 2d 100, 95 
ALR 608, gives general rules regarding conversion. 
65 Corpus Juris 41: "An action of trover 
may be brought for the failure to return property 
to a person who has recovered a judgment estab-
lishing his ownership and right to possession.'' 
Citing: 
Jackins v. Bacon, 63 Cal. App. 463, 218 P. 1027, 
which is a case where the plaintiff -recovered a judgment 
establishing her ownership and right to possession of 
certain stock. The matter. was appealed to the California 
Supreme Court and there affirmed, but the defendant 
Bacon had sold the stock prior to the remittiter to the 
lower court. The plaintiff thereupon brought the re-
ported action for conversion, and on appeal judgment 
for damages for conversion vvas affirmed. The court 
at page 1029 of 218 P., holds: 
''The defendant Baeon 's conversion of the 
stock in question was consummated according to 
the authorities when he \vrongfully exercised acts 
of dominion over said stock in defiance of the 
plaintiff's superior right thereto and interference 
with her lawful right and effort to obtain control 
over said property. * * * * The judgment in the 
said former action only went so far as to provide 
for her recovery of the specific property sued for, 
and this being so, when it appeared that upon 
the entry of such judgment the defendant refused 
to comply with the terms thereof by delivering 
up said property, and when he based his refusal 
upon the ground that prior to the entry of such 
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judgment he had disposed of the same, the plain-
tiff \\·as entitlt•d to fall bark upon her action for 
conversion in order to obtain that relief which 
had been rendered impossible by the defendant's 
refusal to romply \Yith said former judgment and 
by his prior transfer of said property which ren-
dered compliance there,Yith impossible.'' 
California. Laud & Con st. Co. v. H a.Zloran, 82 Utah 
267, 17 P2d 209 at 211, \\'"ns an action for damages for 
'"rongful appropriation of stock. Demurrer to the com-
plaint '"as sustained and the case dismissed. Upon 
appeal this court said : 
"Under our Code of Civil Procedure 've are 
not justified in viewing the allegations of the · 
complaint merely for the purpose of determining 
"\Yhether or not sufficient facts are therein aver-
red to state a cause of action in conversion. Comp . 
. La,,~s Utah 1917, Sec. 6442, provides: 'There is 
in this state but one form of civil action for the 
enforcement or protection of private rights and 
the redress or prevention of private wrongs.' 
Sec. 6566: 'The complaint must contain * * * a 
statement of the facts constituting the cause of 
action in ordinary and concise language.' Under 
these provisions of our Code the form in which 
the action is brought is immaterial. If sufficient 
facts are alleged to entitle plaintiff to relief, the 
pleading will be sustained.'' (Citing: S amuell v. 
IV!oore Mere, Co., 62 Mont. 232, 204 P. 376). 
This California Land case was reversed and re-
manded with directions to reinstate the case and over-
rule the demurrer, as the facts sho\ved and were suffi-
cient to maintain an 
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' 'Action in the nature of an action on t~e case 
for damages sustained by reason of the wrong-
ful appropriation of such bonds or the proceeds 
thereof by a tort-feasor.'' 
Samuell v. Moore Mere. Co., (supra) was an action 
for damages for the destruction of crops. It appeared 
that the plaintiff was not in the actual possession or 
entitled to the immediate possession of the crops and 
judgment of non-suit was entered. The appellate court 
reversed such judgment and remanded for a new trial, 
holding that this was in the nature of an action on the 
case, and as the facts shows that plaintiff was entitled 
to relief, although perhaps not for conversion, the trial 
court was in error. 
DISPOS.AL OF SUBJECT OF ACTION PENDING AP-
PEAL IS CONTEMPT O~F BOTH TRIAL AND 
APPE:LLATE COURTS. 
In the case at bar, the defendants Jones set up their 
claims and rights in and to the crop of grain as a counter-
claim in the original action and invited the District Court 
and the Supreme Court to weigh and determine their 
such rights therein; and judgment was made and enter-
ed against them and in favor of the plaintiff, and the 
said defendants \vere enjoined and estopped to make or 
assert any claim thereto. However, pending the appeal, 
and while the matter was being considered by this Court, 
the said defendant Jones, without any consent of elther 
Court or of the plaintiff, removed and disposed of the 
said crop and since such time has been unable to deliver 
the same to plaintiff. 
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17 ('torpus Juris Secuudnm 13: "It is a con-
tempt of the eourt in "·hich nu nr.tion is pending 
"·illfully to dt~stroy, remove, conceal, or dispose 
of, the subject matter of the litigation, and this 
rule applies to persons as 'veil as to property. 
~ * * The 'Yillful distribution or removal of the 
subject matter of litigation pending an appeal is 
a contempt of the a.ppella te court, and such action 
after obtaining a stay of execution, is a contempt 
of the trial court." (Citing many eases including 
State c. Keller, 36 X:Jl 81, 8P2d 786; and 
State v. Superior Cou,rt, 180 Wash. 115, 39 
P~<I 388 at 390: "Relator appeared in the divorce 
action and 'Yaged a contest over property rights. 
By stipulation he specifically invoked the juris-
diction and requested the action of the court to 
make just and equitable disposition of the prop-
erty. Then, \Yithout the knowledge of the court 
and "~thout the consent of either the court or the 
opposing party, and while the matter in issue 
w·as still under advisement, relator disposed of 
the property in such a way as to render the sub-
sequent order of the court wholly nugatory and 
futile. By his stipulation he invited the court to 
undertake the serious and important duty of 
'veighing and determining the rights of the 
parties. By his act, however, he evidenced his 
intention to render the court's discharge of its 
duty as futile as the dropping of a bucket into 
an empty \Yell. 
''The \villful disposal of the subject matter 
of the litigation by the party in a pending action 
is contempt of court. 13 C.,J. 9. The record in this 
case discloses that relator willfully disposed of 
the subject matter of the pending litigation while 
its disposition was still under consideration by the 
court. He nO\\'" seeks to have the court do that 
which, in effect, \vould be an approval of hi~ act. 
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It is a familiar maxim of equity that he who 
comes into court of equity may not come with 
unclean hands. Having created a situation which 
is wholly inequitable and intentionally subv~rsive 
of the court's solemn adjudication, relator may 
not now invoke the aid of the court in an attempt 
to secure favorable action toward himself.'' 
The defendants Jones in the case at bar evidenced 
an intention to take the property, land and crop, regard-
less of the rights of the plaintiff therein and regardless 
of the decree of the District Court, and regardless of 
the decision of this Court on appeal ; and the said de-
fendants did just that in ejecting the plaintiff from his 
premises, and in harvesting and disposing of the crop 
pending the appeal. The said defandants Jones did not 
in any way evidence any intention to hold and conserve 
the property, land and crop, pending the appeal to this 
court, but on the contrary permitted the said crop to 
go without irrigation so that much of it was withered 
and spoiled and they immediately sold and disposed of 
the crop upon harvesting it. 
AWARD O·F NOMINAL DAMAGES ERR.ONEOUS 
WHE·RE PLAINTIFF CLEARLY ENTITLED 
TO SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGES. 
In the case at bar it is clearly established that plain-
tiff was and is entitled to be compensated for the crop of 
grain, being 2383.68 bushels of wheat which had a fluc-
tuating market value and had a high market value of 
$2.55 per bushel or total value of $6078.38 on or about the 
24th day of January 1948, inasmuch as the said defend-
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ants haYe disposed of the said crop and have been and 
are now unable to deliver the- same to plaintiff. 
The rule is as giYen in ~5 Corpus Juris Secundum at 
page 469 as follows: 
'• Where both the wrong and the damages re-
sulting therefrom are established, plaintiff is 
entitled to recover substantial damages, and an 
award of nominal damages only is erroneous.'' · 
(Citing cases.) 
This rule, the correctness of which is not open to argu-
ment, is appropriate and should be applied in this case 
now before the Court. 
PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO EXEMPLARY DAMAGES 
BY REASON O·F THE WILLFUL, WANTON, MALICIOUS 
AND WRONGFUL NATURE OF DEFE:NDANTS' 
ACTIONS. 
In this case the defendants knew of the plaintiff's 
claim to the premises by written notices given in August 
1943 and in March 1944 prior to the said action which · 
was commenced in July 1946. The defendants knew of 
the commencement of the said first action. They knew of 
their purported rights and claims in and to the said crop 
being fully litigated in the said first action and deter-
mined adversely to them and in favor of the plaintiff. 
They knew of the plaintiff's entry upon the said premises 
with intention to take and assume possession thereof 
upon the making and entering of the judgment in the said 
first action and at the time when the crop was growing on 
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the premises. They knew of and ordered plaintiff's 
ejectment from the premises by their agents and em-
ployees, which ejectment was accomplished belligerently 
and hy show of force. They evidenced no intention what-
ever .of holding and conserving the said crop, but on the 
contrary sold and disposed of it immediately upon har-
vesting it. They at all times acted without the consent of 
/~ 
the plaintiff or of either the Trial or Supreme Courts, 
or any rightful authority whatever. They at all times 
acted willfully, wrongfully, and in complete, wanton and 
reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights in and to the 
said crop. They completely and contemptuously dis-
regarded the judgments and decisions of the Courts. 
They acted completely without good faith, as was affirm-
ed by the Supreme Court in the prior action, but with 
evil intention to take unconscientious advantage of the 
plaintiff. 
Rugg v. Tolman, 39 Utah 295, 117 P. 54, 57, gives the 
Utah rule as to exemplary damages in the following 
language: 
"The law does not, and in the nature of things 
cannot, allow exemplary or punitive damages for 
mere negligence, although gross, nor for mistakes 
that may affect the rights of others, unless some 
act .or acts in.dicative of bad motives or an inten-
tion to oppress or wrongfull vex and harass an-
other is made manifest.'' 
See also: llfurphy v. Booth, 36 Utah 285, 103 P. 768, 
770; Tripp v. Bagley, 75 Utah 42, 282 P. 1026; Falken-
ber.Q v. Neff, 72 Utah 258, 269 P. 1008. 
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Calho~tn v. [Tniversal Cred-it Co., Utah (1944), 146 
P~d ~8-! at ~88, giYes the rule in a. case charging conver-
sion of an automobile by lien holder in the following 
language: 
'~To justify a recovery of exemplary dam-
ages, the art rausing the injury must be done with 
an evil intent and. w·ith the purpose of injuring the 
plaintiff, or zc·£th such a wanto~Jl· and reckless dis·-
regard of h£s rights as evidences a wrongful 
1notive. '' 
In that case the court set aside the judgment for 
punitive damages. Justice Wolfe's opinion sets forth 
that the defendant had tried to act decently in the matter. 
In the case at bar the defendants evidenced an in-
tention to take and dispose of the crop regardless of the 
plaintiff's rights and regardless of the judgments and 
decisions of the Courts. Their willful, evil, wanton and 
reckless actions in this regard warrant the full punitive 
measures prayed for by plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff and appellant submits that he is entitled to 
a reversal of the judgment of the trial court made and 
entered in this cause, with directions to such trial court 
to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against 
the defendants for the amount of $6,078.38 as actual 
damages and for the further sum of $3,000.00 as exem-
plary damages and for costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
C. NELSON DAY, 
Prose. 
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